Virtue ethics: a reaction to rigid theories

    Virtue ethics is as old as the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, but until recently nineteenth and twentieth century philosophers mainly ignored virtues, concentrating instead on developing moral principles, moral rules , and theories about the origin and significance of moral statements. Many philosophers are unhappy with the constraining nature of moral rules and principles. They believe that real situations are too complex to be neatly classified under a rule and so have turned to evaluating character traits. Good choices and good moral judgments depend on good character. People of good character display a practical wisdom that flows from the virtues they possess, virtues like truthfulness, justice, sympathy, love, kindness, care, reverence, discretion, fortitude, gentleness, and patience. They know what is right in the context of real circumstances, though they may have difficulty explaining their views because explanations depend on generalizations and simplified assumptions.   Top

Elizabeth Anscombe's support for virtue ethics

    Elizabeth Anscomb's 1958 article "Modern Moral Philosophy" signals the beginning of the contemporary examination of virtue, as opposed to rules, as a way of doing moral theory. Anscombe argues that the whole idea of basing morality on obligation is a mistake; we cannot be obligated to follow a set of moral rules without a moral lawmaker, for example, God. Yet modern moral philosophy pretends to develop moral rules and principles without a moral rulemaker. She suggests that we are better off to avoid calling actions "morally wrong," that instead we should call them "unjust," "unkind," or "unfair." A just person does not do unjust things, but injustice depends on circumstances, not on consequences, as utilitarians would have us believe, or on universal laws, as Kantians think. A third way, relying on virtues, is signaled by the failure of the first two ways, consequentialism and deontology. Under a virtue view, excellence of character is fundamental in morality; actions are judged by whether they flow from desirable motives and character traits, and not by how well they conform to rules and principles.    Top

Virtue theory and inadequacy of moral rules

    Michael Stocker recently offered an example intended to support virtue theory by showing the inadequacy of a rule approach. Imagine being visited by a friend several times during a hospital stay. After a visit you thank your friend for coming, feeling gratitude and appreciating your friend's moral goodness; your friend then informs you that he or she came simply out of a sense of moral obligation, not out of kindness or affection for you. Now your sense of your friend's moral rightness fades, and you start thinking that you prefer not to be visited by a supposed friend who acts merely from disinterested obligation. While the action, the visit, is the same, the motivation is different, and you now looked upon it negatively because it was not done from a loving or caring disposition, but more formally out of a supposed respect for the moral law. This example shows a need for more than mere formal deontological or consequential thinking: morality includes personal involvement -- personal commitment following from a good character.
    Stocker's example shows that character and motivation are involved in personal relationships: we want parents to act out of love, not simply out of responsibility. But virtue ethics is meant to extend beyond close relationships to all moral decisions. When we decide whether and how much to give to charity, how much time to give to our job, how to divide responsibilities in an organization, or whether to tell a lie to a patient, we cannot simply consult rules or consequences. To make good decisions, more is required. We need a kind of practical wisdom, free from constraining rules. Virtue theorists think that rules are too aloof, too independent from concrete circumstances and consequences to take into account all the demands of a situation. Practical wisdom is not simply a matter of personal commitment. It allows us to make a thoughtful, informed, proper decision that is neither intuitive nor emotional. It comes instead from a wise disposition or a tendency to act in a wise way.
    Virtue theorists have difficulty explaining what practical wisdom is. We can get a better feel for it if we think according to a craft analogy. We know what it is like to do something such as playing a musical instrument, giving a medical or scientific opinion, or criticizing a movie. All of these activities are guided by some rules, but at some point the rules are not adequate. More is needed to do the job. That extra ingredient that allows a person to do excellent work in a craft can be thought of as practical wisdom. Some people have more of it; some have less. If we are interested in getting a good legal opinion, we go to an excellent lawyer. The lawyer may work on hunches or on intricate schemes, even subconscious schemes, that may only make sense to him or her. We may have confidence in the lawyer based on a past record of success, but we may be unable to explain exactly what makes that lawyer so good. Think of the best teacher you have had. Does that teacher teach by the rules? Can another person follow those same procedures and be as good? How does that teacher respond to a difficult question? Does he or she follow some rule about answering questions, or does he or she react out of his or her disposition? A good teacher is attentive, considerate, clear, and thorough; responds to the students' needs and abilities, and so on. None of these dispositions can be defined by rules. To claim that a teacher is excellent or virtuous does not mean that he or she teaches by the rules. Instead it describes a disposition, a tendency to act effectively under appropriate circumstances.   Top

Moral dispositions: basic to virtue theory

    N. J. H. Dent, in The Moral Psychology of the Virtues, argues that the virtue of generosity, a morally praiseworthy disposition, cannot be specified by rules. First of all, the circumstances under which generosity is appropriate are so unpredictable that even the most complex rule could not offer adequate guidance about what generosity entails. Instead generosity is a disposition involving "a steady and consistent direction of concern and intent, willing and desiring another's well-being. . . ." A person is not generous because he or she does acts labeled "generous," but because that person has a "generous heart." "It is because someone has a generous heart that we can specify such acts as generous, since they are just such as would be typical of (though not necessary to) one possessed of a generous heart."
    Dent's claims are typical of a basic virtue perspective. He denies that the virtues can be encapsulated in moral rules. He rejects the notion that moral theory can proceed without incorporating the third way, based on virtues, and he claims that a virtuous disposition makes an act generous or just, rather than that people should develop habits of acting justly or generously according to some prior conception of justice or generosity based on rules or principles. According to the radical virtue perspective, virtuous dispositions are basic in ethical theory. The best way to know right from wrong is to elicit the judgment of a morally virtuous person. Rules and principles may be used; after all, even the virtuous physician typically follows rules, or, rather, follows rules in easy cases. But rules and principles, even when used, are secondary. Their validity is based on the past actions of the virtuous or the habits of the virtuous. When the case is difficult, or when the virtuous person chooses not to follow the rules, then rules are not properly relied upon.
    On the other hand, some virtue theorists reject rules altogether. As is the case in feminist ethics, considered as a type of virtue ethics, rules are thought of as restricting. Virtue theorists believe that all that is needed is a virtuous disposition because rules hide the true complexity and real concerns in individual cases. A parent's love, a disposition, is not shown by following rules but only by acting from loving concern. When rules play no role in a version of virtue ethics, then that version is a form of particularism, but one based rather than on intuition or emotion on character or dispositions.
    If rules and principles are permissible, then to function within a virtue theory, the rules and principles must be supported by, or derivable from, virtues. For example, virtuous people might support a rule, say that those in the middle class or above should give ten percent of their income to charity. But since virtue is the foundation, virtue theorists would consider any rule to be, at best, prima facie, meaning that the rule doesn't hold if the virtuous person believes that it is inappropriate in a particular case. More likely, the rule is a rule of thumb that summarizes how virtuous people have behaved, or have made decisions, in similar cases in the past.
    Rules may help those who are not virtuous to imitate the virtuous. I may watch a great chef prepare food and try to copy his or her technique, carefully formulating rules of behavior to aid me. Following such rules may make me a better cook, but it will not give me the same results because the virtuous chef is constantly adjusting, more or less instinctively, to ingredients and cooking conditions, like relative humidity. The virtuous chef can judge by taste that too little basil has been added, perhaps because the basil used is especially weak, whereas you or I would merely approximate the correct amount by following a rigid rule that fails to respond to flexible circumstances.   Top

Disposition versus action

    Virtue ethics centers on dispositions as primary. This is partly in reaction against contemporary theoretical concentration on actions, on the right thing to do. Virtue theorists think that basic moral judgments should not be about the right action, but about the proper character. Virtue ethics provides an example of a call for a change in the moral domain. If we only judge actions, then it is a mistake to claim that it is good to be courageous in a setting that requires little or no courage. In virtue ethics, it is good for a person to be courageous even if the opportunity to act courageously never arises. Having a virtuous character is thought to be a good in itself, indicative of human flourishing -- that is, what it means to be an excellent human being. On the other side of the coin, a person may act courageously, say under the influence of a drug, and not be a courageous person. That courageous act has no moral status; it is not a morally good act although it may be a good thing that the person was "courageous."   Top

Morality and the need for motivation

    Even when they do not follow rules, people with appropriate moral virtues do the morally correct thing. This leads us back to Anscombe's point about the lack of moral motivation to follow moral rules. Moral rules provide little motivation, but a virtuous disposition inclines a person to act; it supplies the motivation to do the right thing. Even if we consider ourselves as making moral laws for ourselves, it is not clear why or what motivation we have to follow moral rules. We have all made rules for ourselves, like studying more or eating better, and find that without motivation we routinely break the rules. The virtue theorist argues that the person of virtue is motivated to do the right thing, just like a person with great drive to succeed will study more or work harder. The disposition is not only valuable in itself, but it also motivates a person to act in a morally proper way. Philippa Foot, in a foundational book in the movement toward reliance on virtues, Virtues and Vices, claims that although we may legitimately apply moral standards to an agent, moral standards do not motivate that person to do the right thing because it does not give a reason to act, except perhaps for external reasons of punishment or reward.   Top

Evaluating virtue ethics

    Despite the apparent need for virtues in various fields, from accounting to zoology, philosophers have not generally supported a radical or pure virtue theory. Part of this failure to attract a large following has to do with the difficulty in describing or identifying a "virtue." Much of the work in virtue theory has been negative in tone, indicating what is wrong with contemporary approaches to moral theory. Not enough has been done to explain what a virtuous disposition is, how it develops, how it can be located, and how moral judgments are made based on moral dispositions. Even one of the strengths of a virtue theory, its claim that virtues motivate, is obscure. How do virtues motivate? We know how to motivate externally, using praise, blame, and other rewards and penalties. We know that habits develop in response to such external factors, but we know little about internal motivation, even though it appears to be a very significant part of being a good human being.
    Furthermore, the person of virtue is not easy to identify. We all know of cult leaders and political leaders who are revered and followed by many, yet thought to be charlatans by most others. Are these people of virtue, but with virtues that are unrecognized by most, or are these evil people who immorally use their charisma for power over others? The identification of people of virtue is a central problem in virtue ethics, to which we turn in the next section.   Top

Identifying the person of virtue

    In this section we examine three basic ways to identify a person as virtuous: by acts, by character traits, by personality, and by practices. Each has weaknesses, but used together they may allow us to identify a true person of virtue.   Top

    by actions

    The first way to identify a person of virtue, by actions, is the clearest. We simply notice that a person does good things. Mother Teresa is a person of virtue because she does good. Similarly, a good philosopher produces good arguments, a good lawyer wins cases, a truthful person tells the truth, and a courageous person acts courageously. Although this seems a most reliable method, it suffers from the problem that the same action may display a virtue or a vice, or it may be morally neutral. Acting courageously out of greed is different from acting courageously out of a virtuous disposition. Furthermore, in a pure ethic of virtue, acts are secondary to virtues -- that is, we know that acts are good because they are done by virtuous people. To know a virtuous person by his or her actions is to subvert the intentions of virtue ethics by putting actions in a primary position.
    Also, the complexity of circumstances makes it impossible for all but the virtuous to determine the right thing in the right circumstances. The problem we face is to identify the virtuous, and so we beg the question by relying on the virtuous to identify virtuous actions.
    Another problem arises: a good person may act in ways that seem out of character. He or she may have a bad day, or may have experienced some personal tragedy. So a vicious act, even one clearly done out of malice, does not entail the claim that the person doing the act is not virtuous. It might mean that the person is not perfectly virtuous, but we expect that nobody ever was or is. The upshot is that observing only some of a person's acts does not conclusively tell us whether that person is or is not virtuous.   Top

    by character traits

    Instead of identifying the person of virtue by correct action, we may try to identify the virtuous person by their character traits, by realizing that a person is disposed to act an appropriate way. Concluding that good character traits exist is not only related to the acts done. The general demeanor of the person, whom the person associates with, statements made, refusal to accept rewards, the level of sacrifice involved, and the kinds of people who praise the individual, all go beyond a simple evaluation of a person by individual acts. We might not rely merely on the number of faithful acts done to determine that a person has the virtue of fidelity. Instead we may turn to personal and social characteristics. These may mislead us, but even the best scientific tests are sometimes wrong, so this is not a devastating criticism.
    The use of traits to identify the virtuous person leads to another crucial consideration. Particular traits are different from one's entire personality. A person with some virtuous traits may lack others. For example, a courageous person may be cruel. Suppose a person is courageous, yet immoral in most other ways. Are we still willing to call that person morally virtuous? Some would say that virtuous traits are only virtuous in relation to a virtuous personality. In other words, unless a trait belongs to a virtuous person, that trait is not a virtue.
    Plato believed that a person is virtuous if that person has some special insight into goodness. The presence of such an insight means that a person will not have vices, will be courageous, kind, and generous based on a general knowledge of goodness. If a virtue and a vice coexist, that person who has them is not genuinely virtuous but merely appears to be so. Platonic knowledge of the good is very difficult for a person to attain, but once it is attained, that person has a basic virtue, the virtue of wisdom, that guides all of his or her actions. A person of wisdom is also courageous and self-controlled. We might say that Mother Teresa is considerate due to a special religious perspective, her relationship to God; we expect that her orientation, perhaps the source of her virtue, means that she does not have any significant vices. If we found that she were not truthful, we would begin to doubt that she was genuinely considerate.
    Determining whether a person has a particular trait is one thing; a generally virtuous personality is even more difficult to detect. The conclusion that a cult leader is a generally virtuous person is going to get us in more trouble than the determination that he or she has virtuous traits, like courage or loyalty. Many conclude that by ignoring overall character, we may mistakenly believe that a person is virtuous. But the other side of the problem is equally serious. If we assume a virtuous character and ignore some traits, we may be led to believe that cruelty is a virtue because a charismatic person, apparently a person with a virtuous character, is cruel. The history of the world is filled with cases where actions and traits are ignored because of obsession with personality, like the personality of a political or cult leader.    Top

    by social practices

    Discovering true virtue is difficult. Relying on publicly observable actions is not adequate, and knowing a person's character, including intentions, beliefs, and desires, takes us into the unobservable. Another standard for determining the presence of virtue, one that may help to draw a better conclusion, involves social practices. Practices, with their standards, rules, and notions of success, establish who is virtuous from the perspective of those in the practice. Actions or characteristics defined independently of the practice do not indicate virtue, but success in the practice, however that is determined, is the measure of virtue. In medicine, physics, baseball, and ballet, people can, more or less, determine who is successful and who isn't. Standards can be quite rigorous in some disciplines, like classical music, yet genuine success tends to surpass the standards. It may involve intangibles like charisma, or perhaps even luck or proper relationship to others in the practice, like having the "right" teacher. If you become part of that discipline, virtue is determined by whether or not you flourish, or do well, within it. The people who flourish have the virtues defined by their practice. It is not successful acts but general, or typical, success, or perhaps general esteem, that determines the presence of virtue. This involves the opinions of other virtuous people within the practice, even though their judgments may not be based on specific actions, nor on an analysis of character.
    `We may consider morality itself to be a practice. Each epoch or society has its way of defining the morally important virtues. Bravery, intelligence, or kindness may be moral virtues in one time and place but not in another. The meaning of bravery may vary from practice to practice. But the practice determines how to figure out who is virtuous. In short, the person who flourishes in a practice is the virtuous person.
    We may feel uneasy about leaving it up to some vague notion of a practice to determine who is virtuous. This appears to assume that the practice itself is virtuous. Many are not. Part of moral experience involves the evaluation of practices, and we can partly evaluate our own practices by determining whether they produce virtuous people. On the other hand, our practices do help identify virtuous traits. Moral experience involves give and take. Practices help to define virtues, and virtuous people judge practices.
    We cannot not use simple criteria to determine who is virtuous. Yet we do have a good idea that some people are more virtuous than others, and that some people are paradigms of virtue. Perhaps we use, and should use, all the techniques explored above.   Top