Two concepts of rules

    Moral rules are like commands: do this or don't do that. Also, they seem to have exceptions, and we can always inquire about whether they should be followed. Rules are constraints on our actions, but we always have the option to choose to violate a rule. John Rawls argued, in 1955, that rules are not always external constraints on actions. Instead, actions are sometimes defined by rules. To show this he presents two types of rules: summary rules and practice rules.   Top

Summary rules

    A summary rule is a rule of thumb that tells us that good or bad results typically follow from certain types of actions. For example, drinking too much alcohol typically leads to physical problems. A summary rule indicates that we should not do certain things because they lead to bad results and to do certain things because they produce good results. These facts are known through past experience. If we want one result rather than another, a summary rule gives us advice about how to proceed. A good logic teacher notices that certain ways of explaining a technique are effective and other ways confusing. Such knowledge can be stated as a summary rule, and the rule can be followed to gain the desired result. But if circumstances are exceptional, then the rule might not be helpful. If the rule-utilitarian is talking about summary rules, he or she is mistaken in holding that rules should not be broken. When an exception arises, exceptional action may be required.   Top

Practice rules

    A practice rule is different from a summary rule. It defines a type of action; if the rule is not followed, then we are not engaged in the defined activity. Consider playing chess. Suppose a mother is playing chess with her young daughter. She may decide to let the child win, or to allow taking moves over again, or even to permit exceptions by letting the child move some pieces in unusual ways. Now the parent is no longer playing chess. She is instead teaching her daughter how to play, or perhaps just having some fun with a chess set. To play chess, we must obey the rules. Making exceptions to the rules is not possible. Once we do, we are no longer playing that game.
    Suppose we are at a college basketball game. The home team is losing badly, so the referees, noticing the unhappiness of the spectators, decide to count all the baskets of the home team at 3 points. This, they argue, will make the game more interesting, help motivate each team, and make the home crowd happier. They make an exception to the rules of basketball. But we all know that such exceptions, for whatever good they do, are not acceptable. When this happens, the game of basketball is given up; something else is being played.  Top

Changing rules

   Over the years the rules of basketball do change. Official bodies preside over the rules and sometimes change them to make the fans happier. Different rules exist in different leagues and in different levels of play. High school rules are different from college rules. This is acceptable. Practices, such as basketball, may be defined in different ways in different places. And the rules may be changed, perhaps by applying principles like the utilitarian principle. What cannot happen without destroying the game as we know it is for exceptions to be made ad hoc, made up on the spot to solve a particular problem.
    Rawls's reference to games is well taken. Games often have rigid rules, with well-defined structures for changing those rules. The rules may define the practice. And the rules may be evaluated at a higher level, thus changing the practice by producing a new set of rules that cannot be broken while the practice is pursued.  Top

Morality and practice rules

    Rawls extends his notion to the moral realm. Promising, for example, is considered a practice by Rawls. Once we make a promise, it must be kept under Rawls's view because exceptions negate what it is to make a promise. But promises are not like chess. Promises are routinely broken, without guilt, when unexpected circumstances intrude. We have no clear rules about when a promise may be broken and when it should be kept. Because we have no clear rules about promising, we may doubt that promising is a practice. In cases where a promise is not kept, we do not say, as with games, that a type of action is no longer being engaged in. This is true even when a promise is broken.
    The idea of having rules without exceptions would be more compelling, and would bolster the case of the rule-utilitarian, if moral rules were like practice rules. But they are not. Even large-scale practices, like being a student or a parent, are filled with unexpected exceptions. Promising, like the activities involved in many other moral rules, is not a practice like being a lawyer or an elementary school teacher; promising is more amorphous. Even in better-defined practices, like being a lawyer, the rules are not as well-stated as the rules of chess or other games. The analogy, with games is suggestive, but ultimately the problem is to show that moral behavior is like behavior in a game. In many ways it is not, so the analogy breaks down and the attempt to support rule-utilitarianism with practice rules seems unsuccessful to many philosophers.  Top