Nature of moral rules

    Moral rules are statements of universal moral obligation typically involving more specific subject matter than moral principles. For example, rather than telling us to promote happiness, which might serve as a broad moral principle, rules tell us not to lie, not to steal, to support our families, etc.
    Assuming we accept a rule morality, such as Bernard Gert's system of moral rules, how do we know which rules should be on the list? Those who advocate rules as the basic ingredient of the moral experience propose several theories about where rules come from and how they get their legitimacy.    Top

From God’s authority

    Some people argue that the moral rules come from God, and that we know the rules through revelation. This defense provides a religious, not philosophical, view of the origin of moral rules. Philosophically, the view is problematic. Many religions exist and have different concepts of revelation, appeal to different sets of rules, and interpret rules differently. Philosophical problems stem from the fact that many religions claim support for different rules by appeal to the same source: God's will. The ultimate appeal is often to faith, although faith may be backed by philosophical argumentation. But philosophy, by its nature, is willing to question faith.
    Because of the variety of different and conflicting beliefs about what God wills, some believers must be wrong even though they have faith in what they believe. This does not mean that faith is always mistaken. However, philosophers also argue that if God wills specific moral rules, we would still be under obligation to question whether those rules were proper. Suppose God is evil and wills evil rules. How can the sole fact that God wills them make them the proper rules? A religious orientation would reject such reasoning; because God is all-wise and all-good, anyone who believes God's commands are evil would be wrong. Our wisdom and our goodness pale in comparison to God's. Again, this view, which may be correct, appeals to faith, and not to philosophical argumentation.    Top

Moral rules and cultural relativism

Bernard Gert’s view

    The third view about the origin and support of moral rules is supported by Gert: moral rules are best grounded in human rationality. If we have a solid conception of what is rational, we may be able to use that view to formulate a set of moral rules. For example, suppose all people are rational according to the received view. This view, which Gert rejects, holds that people act rationally when, and only when, they seek to get the most of what they desire or prefer. Each person has constraints -- limited time, limited money, limited talent. Given those constraints, rational people try to get as much as possible of the things they prefer. This definition of rationality may preclude the existence of an acceptable set of moral rules. Why should people support rules that limit the extent to which they can get what they want? Why not steal, or even kill, to get what we want? Nothing in the standard definition of rationality says that we should not do those things. The contemporary American philosopher David Gauthier argues (link below to a fuller account of his view) that this perception is mistaken. We do need each other's help. We do need to cooperate. If moral rules help us to cooperate, and thereby help us to get more of what we want, then rational people would be willing to be bound by rules. This is so even if, on a special occasion, more could be gained by breaking the rules. However, we all know that others may gain by breaking rules, so we may all rationally decide to bind ourselves, in advance, to rules, because in the long run this may be the way to get more.
    Many thinkers object to this line of defense for moral rules. It runs into the problem of the free-rider, a person who gains from the cooperation of others while failing to cooperate himself or herself. A skillful free-rider may support rules in public, condemn others who do not obey the rules, and yet, for his or her own advantage, break the rules in secret. If this person is good at deceit, he or she may rationally deny the moral force of any list of rules. Furthermore, other thinkers object to the notion that morality is bound up with this artificial received view on rationality. The received view depends on the existence of an isolated self; it rejects a social self, with basic social ties and extended, often amorphous, sympathy with others. People do not have individually defined, stable preferences but instead respond to social fads, social customs, and social evaluations. Finally, some thinkers object to basing morality on the received view of rationality because it is the antithesis of morality. Morality is a social constraint on self-regarding action. At its best, the defense of morality on the basis of a self-centered notion of rationality is amoral. At its worst, it supports immoral action.   The contemporary American philosopher Kurt Baier challenges us to consider whether we would prefer a world with moral rules to one without. Most would agree that moral rules are generally beneficial. Gauthier, and those who support a moral system on the basis of the received view of rationality, attempt to generalize this benefit by making it a requirement of morality. Although general benefit may partially validate the use of moral rules, that defense cannot adequately address the problem of the free-rider, or the social identity of human beings.

From intuition

    The last defense we examine claims that no adequate reasons can be given in favor of the moral rules. We simply know, perhaps by intuition or even by social conditioning, that a rule is proper. That promises should not be broken is self-evident. If someone argues that keeping promises is not rational or that better consequences follow without the duty to keep promises, we may respond by saying that we have a self-evident duty to keep promises. That is, by careful reflection on what we believe, we will understand that we are more convinced of this duty than we are of the reasons offered against it, or, indeed, offered in its favor.
    As you might expect, many philosophers reject self-evident or intuitive support for moral rules. Intuitions differ from person to person and if they exist, may be socially caused. Yet we do have strong beliefs that we cannot adequately defend. Often we find ourselves responding emotionally when we encounter behavior that breaks moral rules. This emotional or intuitive response is tapped by literature and movies. We know that the treatment the *"Elephant Man" received was wrong; we may have more confidence in the belief that it was wrong than any reasons we may offer for why it was. We may be amazed by or shocked at someone who can view such inhumane treatment and believe it morally proper. Regardless of where such apparent intuitions come from, some reactions against immorality are widely shared and are a significant part of our moral experience.
   In the end perhaps the best defense of a list of moral rules is the fact that many people, at different times and places, have accepted such rules as a basic part of moral experience. We have examined some basic ways of defending moral rules. They may be founded on rationality, God's will, the demands of social life, or intuitions. But we cannot deduce moral rules from these considerations because we do not know what rules people intuitively support, or what rules God wills, or what rules all rational people accept.    Top

Moral rules: derived from principles?

   Another defense of the moral rules might be thought to come from moral principles, but this defense would undermine the autonomy of the moral rules. We have been examining a rule approach to morality, one that rejects the use of basic principles. A rule-oriented approach accepts rules as the foundation of moral experience. However, some approaches combine the use of rules and principles.; thus, rules might be supported by principles but cannot be fully derived from them. (See rule utilitarianism in the links provided).  Top