The need for feminist ethics

    Over the last few decades feminists have claimed that in the history of ethics, and in contemporary ethics, a crucial, perhaps dominant, part of the moral experience has been excluded. That part is associated with the biological status and cultural roles of women. The American philosopher Mary Ellen Waithe demonstrates, in her four-volume examination of women in the history of philosophy, that women have been a significant and fruitful force in the history of philosophy. Yet most of the dominant theories today and much of the work done in philosophical ethics have been developed by men. This fact alone raises the prospect that any special feminine perspective on moral experience may have been excluded. Added to this, many philosophers, such as Aristotle, have portrayed women as subordinate. These facts led to an examination by feminists of the history of philosophy in general and of ethics in particular.
    The feminist movement in philosophy is diverse. Some feminists have rejected ethics altogether, and others call for amendments or extensions to dominant theories. Some believe that a special ethical theory, lesbian ethics, can be developed around sexual orientation as a pervasive aspect of human life. Others have claimed that women have a unique view that is capable of supporting a different ethical theory, centering on the notion of care. Here we examine gender bias and special women's issues.   Top

Gender bias

    Many ethical theories are presented in an apparently gender-neutral way. For example, John Rawls' theory of justice stipulates that principles must be established without any consideration of gender. Feminists have claimed that such gender-neutral perspectives may mask gender bias. For example, a theory of justice that excludes the importance of family life, as does much of ethical theory, including that of Rawls, may involve gender bias. This is because traditionally women have been oriented toward home and family. Philosophers have ignored issues about the ethical status of family arrangements, the social impact of such issues, and their differential impact on men and women. Since many of these issues affect women differently, a bias may be present that favors issues that dominate male situations.
    Without paying special attention to gender, we may have difficultly establishing whether boys and girls are raised differently, counseled differently, treated differently in school, and assigned different career paths regardless of skill. An ethic that insists without exception on following rules may ignore previous differential treatment. Moral rules that disregard gender differences may be insensitive to the use of offensive language, or to the need for special career guidance or laws relating to discrimination.
    Feminists can easily point to explicit statements from the history of philosophy that downplay or denigrate women, but finding subtle bias is more difficult. Bias may be found where it does not exist, and the finding of bias may be biased. Although bias can be subtle and difficult to detect, we know that it does often exist. The way male and female children are called upon in classrooms, even by women, appears to be biased in subtle ways. Rules that ignore special categories may be criticized when they are applied in ways that refuse to make exceptions or in ways that compound past difficulties.
    Feminists are united on one thing: that bias against women is wrong. The contemporary philosopher Alison M. Jaggar, who writes extensively on feminist concerns, claims:

The feminist commitment is incompatible with any form of moral relativism that condones the subordination of women or the devaluation of their moral experience.

Feminist issues

    When the roles of men and women differ, their moral experience is also likely to be different. In traditional relationships, women have raised children and have had less impact on politics, business, and higher education. Military leaders, police officers, firefighters, construction workers, medical doctors, and lawyers were mainly men. These jobs -- involving social power -- tend to have their own sense of morality, their own moral regulations, and their own responsibilities. But such jobs are usually impersonal. The goals involved are often objectively defined, and personal involvement is limited by rules, procedures, and regulations. Male experience has been more associated with such environments, while women have been traditionally more associated with the personal commitments involved in family life. These differences may lead to unlike perspectives on ethical responsibility and to divergent attitudes about the importance of social problems and social responsibilities.
   The following concerns all have been considered to be of special interest to women, or to address the special needs and circumstances of women: justice within a family, women's responsibility to the family, the need for adequate health care, abortion rights, the need for adequate daycare, protection in divorce, children's rights, and education. Other concerns deal with the treatment of women in the workplace, in education, or in daily interaction: just opportunity, fair advancement, sexual harassment, rape and assault prevention, maternal leave, on-the-job daycare, equal treatment in counseling, equal sports opportunity, the representation of women in education, and the use of sexist language. These interests, feminists claim, have been overlooked or shortchanged by traditional and contemporary male-centered ethical inquiry. Each presents an occasion for exploitation and discrimination, and so any theory or point of view that fails to address any of these is considered incomplete or immoral.
    Women's moral experience is different from men's in relation to bearing and raising children, to sexuality, to education, and to the workplace. On these issues feminists have rejected the idea that a male-dominated investigation can adequately represent their point of view. But women do not all agree on conclusions and evaluations relating to women's issues, and some women reject the notion of a feminist perspective. Nevertheless, a woman's experience, especially when supported by many other women, has considerable moral weight. Moral experience is properly "ours"; it should be as inclusive as possible. To have some views, whether ultimately accepted or rejected, under-represented, or not represented at all, diminishes the value of moral theory and precludes taking moral experience as seriously as it should be.
    In the abortion debate we should take seriously the claim of many women that the prohibition of abortion puts them at special risk, takes their bodies out of their control, and gives them a less significant moral status than the fetus. This experience, the experience of unfairness, is part of our moral experience. Other women experience an attachment to the fetus as their child. They support it as a unique moral entity. The experiential closeness to the fetus is not one that many men easily appreciate. This experience is also part of our moral data. Without taking into account all aspects of moral experience, proper decisions on the morality and legality of abortion are unlikely. To take into account all aspects of moral experience is not to insist on an extreme relativism; it is instead to insist that the debate be full. In a full debate sometimes one side or the other wins, but often partial compromise and mutually supportive alternatives appear to be viable and may be supported by both sides. In the case of abortion this may involve increased sex education, availability of contraceptives, widely-supported adoption alternatives, and financial support. This is consistent with the legality of abortion on demand, but may reduce its occurrence.
    The debate over abortion is not likely to be solved soon. When the point of view of those who have most at stake is not given full consideration, the conclusions reached are suspect.   Top