CULTURAL RELATIVISM

The nature of cultural relativism
Support for cultural relativism
The extent of cultural differences
Is cultural relativism inconsistent?
Evaluating cultural relativism
The objectivity of moral standards                           Return to contents

The nature of cultural relativism

    Cultural relativism, as a philosophical doctrine, makes the claim that proper moral standards are relative to a culture. Taken a short step further, it informs us that all proper standards are derived from culture. We are not, individually, the keepers of our own standards; cultural relativism denies that sort of subjectivity. We are obligated to use the standards of our culture, and although these standards are relative to a culture, they are objective because they are a matter of fact.    Top

Support for cultural relativism

    Cultural relativism gains support form the fact that so many people around the world have different moral standards. Support also runs deeper. Three claims can be made about these differences, each attempting to support the legitimacy of cultural relativism as a philosophical doctrine:

  (1) If correct standards, like those in ethics, are independent of culture, one would think that after millions of years of human existence we would find more agreement among people around the world, the sort of agreement we find, for example, in science.

  (2) In ethics, objective "truth" is contentious; no single theory in Western tradition has convinced philosophers about the correct nature of objective moral evidence independent of cultural commitment. In some fields, like science, most people agree that factual observation plays a key role. In ethics we find little agreement about values and about the basis for values. We do know that people are committed to the values of their cultures, and we have little reason to believe that any more objective basis actually exists. In this way, moral standards are much like the standards of etiquette.

  (3) Those who study the values of people in other countries often find that those other value commitments make sense given their different circumstances, attitudes, and beliefs. It is only when judged in relation to foreign values and beliefs that the standards of others look strange. There is, in short, no good reason to reject the values of other people; the basis for rejection is typically merely another set of cultural values, which itself can claim no objectivity other than its cultural base.

    For these three reasons -- the lack of agreement about moral values, the absence of a clear standard for objective truth in ethics, and the invalidity of cultural chauvinism -- cultural relativism should stand as a serious doctrine in moral theory. Think of those occasions where people you associate with violate basic cultural standards. These violations may involve personal hygiene, or improper standards of behavior in a group, say in a classroom, or failure to pay proper respect to friends or relatives. We believe that many standards involved in these areas are culturally relative and not based on values independent of cultural life. When a person violates basic cultural standards everyone becomes uncomfortable; we don't know what to expect from such people, and we often judge them as immoral. At those moments, when basic cultural standards are violated, we come to place increased value on them.    Top

The extent of cultural differences

    Philosophers often argue that the existence of cultural differences does not prove that cultural relativism is a correct doctrine. However, the defense of cultural relativism does not merely rest with differences, the first point mentioned above. The other two points are as important. Nevertheless, some philosophers claim that cultural differences have been exaggerated; groups do have different values, but these differences might stem from conflicting factual beliefs or from differing circumstances. For example, a group facing economic hardship might believe that the humane treatment requires infanticide; or religious beliefs, thought to be factual, might dictate the way the dead are treated. Different groups may equally value respect for human life, but they may apply that value under different circumstances, so that factual and not value differences produce apparently conflicting judgments.
    This analysis seems correct. Given divergence in circumstance and belief, a similar moral principle might produce different conclusions. How we attempt to avoid harm depends on the circumstances we face. Differing beliefs and differing circumstances might take away much of the strength of the first reason in favor of cultural relativism, but even if exaggerated, it still remains the case that significant differences in value commitment exist. For example, even when faced with hardship, people in many cultures would typically refuse to kill a newborn infant.    Top

Is cultural relativism inconsistent?

    Some philosophers not only claim that too much is made of the moral differences, they also argue that cultural relativism contains the seeds of its own destruction. When we are in foreign circumstances and notice that people behave differently, we are reminded that these actions are consistent with their values and culture. Judging foreigners by the values of our culture is chauvinistic. Who are we to say that our way is better? Here is the problem: Cultural relativism is thought to teach tolerance yet may support intolerance. We are advised to be tolerant of cultural differences, yet the cultural values of a group may demand intolerance.
    Respecting cultural values is often a good, but like most good things, it can be taken too far. The cultural relativist refuses to be tolerant when someone violates a cultural standard. Most believe this commitment to a culture's values is a mistake because many cultural standards are arbitrary, harmful, confusing, or even ridiculous. Those who know about other cultures may use that knowledge to reflect on and even reject their own, formerly accepted, standards. Perhaps tolerance should be shown for such people, even by those committed to preserving cultural standards.
    Another issue intrudes. Tolerance is taught by the cultural relativist, who says that we should not reject the standards, moral and non-moral, of any culture. But suppose our own culture or subculture is chauvinistic.    Are we then obliged to be intolerant? In general, should we be tolerant of the intolerant? Should we tolerate destructive, harmful, hateful, or offensive action done in the name of a cultural commitment?     Top

Evaluating cultural relativism

    Cultural relativism is incorrect; we typically do evaluate cultural standards; this is one of the functions of ethical theory. We live in a rapidly changing world, one that makes many cultural standards into relics of the past, better off rejected or superseded. Also, in some cultures we find many types of moral standards. People in the same culture believe in different principles, rules, customs, and practices. Cultural relativism incorrectly suggests that people in a culture have one set of standards. When a person is faced with a variety of perspectives, cultural relativism is unable to offer guidance because it apparently claims that all those standards are proper and should be followed, even when they conflict.
    Standards and moral values conflict within cultures, and, furthermore, people can use standards that are largely independent of their own cultures. If we know about standards in other cultures, these may be used to check the value of our own standards. We can apply principles and even moral ideals fashioned through creative use of reasoning skills, sometimes apparently independent of a particular cultural past. Because human beings are resourceful, we can, to a significant degree, distance ourselves from our cultures and subcultures. Since some cultural practices may be outdated, or even immoral, being able to judge a culture is advantageous. Even when a blanket condemnation of a culture is ill-advised, because it may leave us aimless or without secure ways to act, efforts to make cultural life better may be advisable.     Top

The objectivity of moral standards

    There are answers to problems raised above suggesting that moral standards are not objective in the way similar to scientific standards and that we have no basis for rejecting the actions of others in different cultures. First of all, it took human beings millions of years of develop the current sense of scientific objectivity. Though disputes, even basic disputes, still exist in physics, the level of agreement does surpass that in ethics, but this doesn't mean that objective standards do not exist in moral inquiry, and it doesn't preclude the movement toward greater agreement in the future. Furthermore, some practical disciplines, like medicine, that are thought to be more objective than morality, rest on moral presuppositions involving, for example, the value of good health. In medicine much disagreement exists over the proper balance of risk versus benefit, a moral question. Furthermore, much agreement does exist; people in most cultures reject lies, murder, gratuitous harm, and so forth. Exaggerating moral disagreement is unhelpful.
    Nevertheless, cultural standards are part of the moral experience, perhaps a necessary part. They help to determine who has what moral responsibility in given circumstances. They also help to establish expectations about the behavior of others. Ignoring cultural standards is often morally risky, but pinning all of morality on them is improper.     Top


See also:

     DIVERSITY AND MULTICULTURALISM
     EVOLUTIONARY RELATIVISM
     OBJECTIVITY, SUBJECTIVITY, AND MORAL VIEWS
     PLURALISM