CULTURAL RELATIVISM
The nature of cultural relativismCultural relativism, as a philosophical doctrine, makes the claim that proper moral standards are relative to a culture. Taken a short step further, it informs us that all proper standards are derived from culture. We are not, individually, the keepers of our own standards; cultural relativism denies that sort of subjectivity. We are obligated to use the standards of our culture, and although these standards are relative to a culture, they are objective because they are a matter of fact. Top Support for cultural relativismCultural relativism gains support form the fact that so many people around the world have different moral standards. Support also runs deeper. Three claims can be made about these differences, each attempting to support the legitimacy of cultural relativism as a philosophical doctrine:
For these three reasons -- the lack of agreement about moral values, the absence of a clear standard for objective truth in ethics, and the invalidity of cultural chauvinism -- cultural relativism should stand as a serious doctrine in moral theory. Think of those occasions where people you associate with violate basic cultural standards. These violations may involve personal hygiene, or improper standards of behavior in a group, say in a classroom, or failure to pay proper respect to friends or relatives. We believe that many standards involved in these areas are culturally relative and not based on values independent of cultural life. When a person violates basic cultural standards everyone becomes uncomfortable; we don't know what to expect from such people, and we often judge them as immoral. At those moments, when basic cultural standards are violated, we come to place increased value on them. Top The extent of cultural differences Philosophers often argue that the existence of cultural differences
does not prove that cultural relativism is a correct doctrine. However, the defense of
cultural relativism does not merely rest with differences, the first point mentioned
above. The other two points are as important. Nevertheless, some philosophers claim that
cultural differences have been exaggerated; groups do have different values, but these
differences might stem from conflicting factual beliefs or from differing circumstances.
For example, a group facing economic hardship might believe that the humane treatment
requires infanticide; or religious beliefs, thought to be factual, might dictate the way
the dead are treated. Different groups may equally value respect for human life, but they
may apply that value under different circumstances, so that factual and not value
differences produce apparently conflicting judgments. Is cultural relativism inconsistent? Some philosophers not only claim that too much is made of the moral
differences, they also argue that cultural relativism contains the seeds of
its own destruction. When we are in foreign circumstances and notice that people behave
differently, we are reminded that these actions are consistent with their values and
culture. Judging foreigners by the values of our culture is chauvinistic. Who are we to
say that our way is better? Here is the problem: Cultural relativism is thought to teach
tolerance yet may support intolerance. We are advised to be tolerant of
cultural differences, yet the cultural values of a group may demand intolerance. Evaluating cultural relativism Cultural relativism is incorrect; we typically do evaluate cultural
standards; this is one of the functions of ethical theory. We live in a
rapidly changing world, one that makes many cultural standards into relics of the past,
better off rejected or superseded. Also, in some cultures we find many types of moral
standards. People in the same culture believe in different principles, rules, customs, and
practices.
Cultural relativism incorrectly suggests that people in a culture have one set
of standards. When a person is faced with a variety of perspectives, cultural relativism
is unable to offer guidance because it apparently claims that all those standards are
proper and should be followed, even when they conflict. The objectivity of moral standards There are answers to problems raised
above suggesting that moral standards are not
objective in the way similar to scientific standards and that we
have no basis for rejecting the actions of others in different cultures. First of all,
it took human beings millions of years of develop the current
sense of scientific objectivity. Though disputes, even basic disputes, still exist in
physics, the level of agreement does surpass that in ethics, but this doesn't mean that
objective standards do not exist in moral inquiry, and it doesn't preclude the movement
toward greater agreement in the future. Furthermore, some practical disciplines, like
medicine, that are thought to be more objective than morality, rest on moral
presuppositions involving, for example, the value of good health. In medicine much
disagreement exists over the proper balance of risk versus benefit, a moral question.
Furthermore, much agreement does exist;
people in most cultures reject
lies, murder, gratuitous harm, and so forth. Exaggerating moral disagreement is unhelpful. See also:
DIVERSITY AND MULTICULTURALISM
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