BASIC VALUES: DEVELOPING A MORAL THEORY

Using basic values
Rationality: a nonmoral basic value
Moral basic values
Advantages to using a basic value                           Return to contents

Using basic values              

    Moral realism is committed to the existence of external, independent moral properties. The basic value approach, which we examine in this section, does not. It is typically neutral about the independent existence of any moral property. Instead, this approach flows from an examination of the moral experience, or some aspect considered central to the moral experience. This is how Immanuel Kant proceeded. He wanted to know what makes an action morally good. A good will, doing something because it is the right thing to do, is for Kant the central aspect from which moral theory flows.
   Other basic values come to mind. The American philosopher Alan Gewirth considered moral debate, the attempt to determine the right thing to do, as central. Debate presupposes free participation. In this way freedom becomes the moral value around which all moral experience flows.   Top

Rationality: a nonmoral basic value    

    Another philosopher, David Gauthier, focuses on rationality. Rationality is often thought to involve self-interest. Gauthier attempts to develop a moral theory that all rational people can accept by using self-interest as a nonmoral central value. Selecting a nonmoral value as central is troublesome because a theorist using it as basic must then show how a moral obligation flows from a nonmoral concern. This is what G. E. Moore's open-question test really amounts to. Why are we morally obliged to seek some nonmoral value like pleasure or individual rationality? The problem is that leaving the central value undefended is unsatisfying. We want good reasons for reliance on a central value from which all moral obligations are derived. But if the value is defended, the defense likely will involve other values that then compete with the central value for importance. Gauthier resorts to values like autonomy in defending his conception of rationality. Free people should be allowed to follow their own interests. We may approve of autonomy, but when mentioned it becomes another value in the system, not easily derived from the basic value. Suppose individual rationality conflicts with an environment that promotes autonomy. The basic approach, with rationality as the central value, is then lost because rationality has no proper defense -- the defense autonomy was intended to provide.   Top

Moral basic values

    Suppose, instead, that a moral value is selected as the central value. One problem is eliminated; the value already has connotations of moral responsibility. But a second problem remains. If the central value is defended, other values start to play a coequal role, militating against the central value approach.
   Even if these problems can be avoided, relying on a central value presents a restricted morality. It violates the notion that our moral experience is broad and supplies the test of any moral theory. Moral experience is the raw data of moral theory; we must show that a theory either conforms to moral experience in some way or another, or that much of moral experience is improper or may be derived and ordered by a central concern. When too much of that experience is excluded, the burden of proof is on the central value theorist. It is unlikely that the theorist will meet that challenge.   Top

Advantages to using a basic value

    Yet, the attempt to base morality on a central value is worthwhile. Theories are helpful even when they are not the whole truth. Gauthier tries to spell out what a "rational" ethical theory would be like. Other theories violate his conception; for example, to be a utilitarian is not always rational, from an individual perspective. Insofar as this is the case, Gauthier shows us that something is wrong because we prefer a world in which being a utilitarian does not entail excessive self-sacrifice. We might not be able to resolve the problem -- the conflict between individual rationality and gaining welfare generally -- we can take note of the significance of the problem in the hope that someday it may be resolved. Rejecting Gauthier's concern, that much of moral theory is hostile to individual interests, is not the answer. Instead we need a more inclusive theory, one that takes Gauthier's concern seriously.   Top