Metaethics versus substantive ethics

    Metaethics is the study of moral theory: what it attempts to do; how it is properly established; the meaning of basic moral terms, such as 'obligation' and 'goodness'; and the objectivity of moral inquiry. Many philosophers believe that moral inquiry should begin with metaethical investigation, and some believe that a philosopher's only proper job is to make metaethical observations; such philosophers object to substantive ethics the branch of moral theory that provides guidance about what we ought do. For example, if we ask whether moral rules are proper or whether all moral judgments should be made in reaction to particular circumstances without using rules, we are engaged in a metaethical inquiry. The question is posed without addressing any particular moral values. Also, much of what we accomplished in moral theory is definitional. What does freedom mean? How is equality defined? What constitutes a harm. Definitions are part of metaethics. However, as conceptions take shape, moral claims about whether actions are morally right or morally wrong typically intrude. So an attempt to define basic moral values tends to lead into substantive ethics.
    Metaethics is a refined aspect of moral theory because it is pursued abstractly and technically. Further, it is about moral theory, also an abstract approach to morality. Though refined in the philosophical literature, our metaethical views, even if implicit, will influence the substantive positions we accept. So perhaps it is correct to say that metaethics should come first in moral inquiry.  Top

Observations and moral inquiry

    Those philosophers who reject substantive theories are often motivated by a strict empiricism, the view that all genuine knowledge is linked, more or less directly, to observations. Facts determine whether something is true or false. Since no moral facts exist, according to philosophers such as A. J. Ayer, then the only job of a philosopher is to show that moral statements have no objective status, or are meaningless. In effect, statements about ethics simply appeal to emotions or feelings, much like poetry. Whether poetic statements are true or false is not the point. The way poems affect our sensitivities is what counts.  Top

Morality and language

    Other philosophers claim that the correct function of a philosopher rests entirely in analyzing language. These analytic philosophers often declared that substantive ethics is outside philosophy's proper domain. Instead, metaethics helps to sort out the use of moral language. It helps decide whether moral statements --, such as Doing action X is morally obligatory (with 'X' used as a variable to represent any action at all) -- follow an implicit logic. That is, if a person makes this claim, can we derive other statements from the speaker's belief? If Jane thinks that action X is obligatory for John, does that imply that Jane should also consider that X is obligatory for Alice, whose situation is similar to John's?
    Suppose that when I claim that X is obligatory for person P, I imply that X is also obligatory for all people whose situation is similar to P's. Kant says something like this, except that he goes a step further. For him proper universal claims in ethical discourse are morally binding on everyone. However, the morally binding nature of such claims does not derive from an analysis of language. An analysis of language makes claims about how language is used. This does not mean that we are morally bound to act in ways dictated by the common use of language. Substantive philosophers, including Kant, think they know what we ought to do or refrain from doing. Kant's examination of moral obligation is substantive because he gives direction about our actions and not simply about how we use words.  Top

Distinction between substantive ethics and metaethics

    The distinction here is not completely sharp; after all, when we are told about the logic of moral terms, we are also told how we ought to use them. If Jane thinks that it is wrong for her to do X, she inconsistent if she does not think Alice -- who faces nearly identical circumstances --is also obligated to do X. But there is a difference between a analysis of consistent use of language and moral obligation. Kant thought that certain actions, regardless of how we use words or the values we hold, are morally prohibited; a strict analysis of language simply tells how to use words consistently and how to make moral evaluations depending on the moral claims we make. If I claim that you are wrong to tell a lie, then I may be inconsistent if I also claim that it is acceptable for me to lie in similar circumstances, but whether telling a lie is actually prohibited, as Kant thought, is not a matter that cannot be resolved by the logic of moral language.  Top

Decline of metaethics

    In British and American philosophy, under the dominance of positivism (a strict form of empiricism) and analytic philosophy, metaethics took primacy. Today positivism is not the received view among philosophers. Philosophers recognize that gaining knowledge is not straightforward; even scientific beliefs are not as closely related to observations as the positivists believed. Analytic philosophy also became less secure about how to examine the use of language. A close examination of language leads to questions that are substantive because conclusions about the use of language implicitly bring with them substantive claims -- for example, that we ought to be consistent. Problems of philosophy are not merely questions about the use of language, so as philosophers returned to traditional philosophical problems, the dominance of positivism and strict analytic philosophy over substantive ethics faded. Today philosophers, including analytic philosophers, do both substantive ethics and metaethics. Though not clearly distinct from substantive ethics, metaethics is helpful in doing substantive ethics, and substantive ethics helps to clarify and stimulate metaethical inquiry.  Top

X is good

    What does it mean to say that some action or some thing is 'good'? In this century, philosophers have paid special attention to this metaethical question. Utilitarianism provides an answer to the question: 'the action that produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people' is what we mean by 'moral goodness'. As a definition, this statement seems to make two things interchangeable. Whenever we say "morally good," we are using shorthand for "the action that produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people."
    But does "good" really mean what the utilitarian claims? Some philosophers might counter by saying that any attempt to define 'moral goodness' is futile because 'moral goodness' is literally meaningless: meaning relates to observations and moral terms do not refer to anything at all. No observations, they think, can back up a moral statement. So for some philosophers, like the positivists, the question we began with, about the meaning of goodness, is a waste of time. But this position is mistaken. We do talk and debate about whether actions are morally good, and our statements make sense. If such use of speech about morality is meaningless, we need a solid argument to show that it is. The positivist's definition that all meaning relates to observation defines 'meaning' in a way that itself goes beyond observation, and even theoretical terms in science, like 'electron', are not defined in terms of observational statements. So instead of rejecting the meaning of terms seriously used in ordinary discourse, some philosophers seriously question whether the utilitarians have the right definition of "good."   Top

Naturalism

    Utilitarianism is a form of naturalism, a theory that centers on natural things, the kinds of things we see around us and explore through our senses. Naturalism is a reductionism. Reduction occurs when one thing is broken down into something more basic, and it is claimed that all there is to the more complex thing is contained in the more basic. Naturalism reduces all things, like human personality, morality, and the objects explored in science, to natural events. Psychological states, like willing or believing, might be thought of as the subject of an independent science, but for a naturalist, if we knew enough, we would be able to reduce all psychological statements to statements about physical events, perhaps brain states. This claim would be reductionist: psychological statements are ways of making shorthand claims about physical events. For example, the fact that I now desire another sip of coffee is shorthand for all the physical occurrences going on in my body, and, most importantly, in my brain. The reductionist does not believe in some special free will, or a desire that is somehow independent from the physical state of my body. Similarly, naturalism in ethics reduces moral claims to claims about naturally occurring events. For example, utilitarians claim that all moral statements ought to be reduced to statements about pleasures people experience. Many other forms of naturalism can be found. For example, the American philosopher Ralph Barton Perry argues that moral obligations are reducible to human interests.  Top

G.E. Moore’s examination of naturalism: the open question test

    After the turn of the twentieth century, the British philosopher G. E. Moore examined naturalism in ethics, including Perry's naturalism, to determine whether it contains fallacious thinking. He wasn't especially interested in examining any particular form of naturalism; instead he wanted to explore moral naturalism in general. He concluded that naturalism is incorrect, that 'good' could not be defined by reducing it to any natural quality. His argument is simple, yet ingenious. Suppose someone claims that 'good' is defined as the action that produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. We can question this. Does 'good' really mean the action that produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people? Our question makes perfect sense. Yet if 'good' really meant what the utilitarians claim, our question would not make sense. This is so because the definition offered is thought to make words interchangeable; 'good' may be substituted for the longer string of words and vice versa. By substitution the definition permits us to claim that we are really saying "Does 'good' really mean 'good'?" This is not a significant question. Since this is an insignificant question, and the original question is significant, Moore concludes that the two questions cannot be equivalent. The fact that we significantly question whether 'good' means 'the action that produces the greatest happiness' shows a difference in meaning between 'good' and the natural qualities to which good is reduced.
    Moral naturalism, according to Moore's open question test, fails. This open question, "Is this really what we mean by 'good'? can be asked about any proposed natural standard. Is the maximal satisfaction of interests really good? Is any supposed reduction of goodness to a natural quality really what we mean by 'good'? Since these questions make sense, definitions of 'good' using natural properties do not work. Any naturalism fails to offer an acceptable definition of 'good'. Moore believed, and many philosophers agreed, that he had successfully defeated all naturalistic positions in ethics.  Top

Moral goodness: a non-natural quality

    Moore offered an alternative account of goodness; instead of being reducible to natural qualities, moral goodness is a non-natural quality that cannot be defined. Definitions of one term depend on other terms. But some terms are so basic that they cannot be defined, like 'yellow'. It would be futile to define a color, although we might indicate that the appearance of a color is always associated with a certain reflection of light. We see or intuit colors. Moore thought that we intuit goodness much in the way we see colors, but with a nonnatural "sense" instead of a natural sense like sight. Moore thus links his nonnaturalism with intuitionism in ethics.
    Although philosophers have taken seriously Moore's rejection of naturalism, they show little support for his non-naturalism. It is a strange doctrine that assumes an ability to detect qualities about which we can say little. People do not intuit goodness similar to the way they see redness, but instead they seem to respond differently to situations as good or bad, depending on their backgrounds, culture, and commitments. Even though differences in how something is seen may relate to a person's background, differences in moral reaction are more pronounced than differences in sensory observations.
    Moore started out with the question about the meaning of 'good' and, through his analysis, weakened the naturalist attempt to define the word. However, he failed to produce a satisfactory solution, and he opened the door for others to speculate about the significance of moral claims.   Top

Emotivism

    Emotivists attempt to define moral terms by focusing on the fact that people respond differently to situations. Emotivists contend that we claim things are good or bad neither based on some nonnatural quality nor by reducing events to natural qualities; to say that something is good is not to claim that a thing has a quality, natural or nonnatural. Instead, the statement is merely a report of a person's positive feeling. It is about the emotions of the user of the word and not about features of events. This steers a course between naturalism and nonnaturalism. But emotivism appears to be false. People call things 'good' despite their apparent absence of positive feelings about those things. They also debate moral opinions in ways that seem to depend on reasons rather than emotions. Emotivism does not offer a compelling account of moral deliberation and debate.  Top

Prescriptivism:  R.M. Hare

    The British philosopher R. M. Hare proposes a more neutral definition. He developed a doctrine called prescriptivism. When a claim is made that some thing or some action is good, that thing or action is commended or praised. But more than commendation is involved. Moral commendation also implies the claim that others should hold the thing or action in similar high regard. For me to claim that something is good means that I commend it, and you should commend it as well. In effect, by claiming that an action is good, one person prescribes an action for another.
    But this does not get us far enough. On what basis should we commend things? Is a commendation objective or merely subjective? Can one evaluation be more objective than another? In the examination of the meaning of a word, we fail to determine an adequate base for substantive moral judgments.   Top