Meaning of intuitionism

    Intuitionism is the metaethical doctrine claiming that moral principles, rules, or judgments are clear and obvious truths that do not need to be supported by argumentation. G.E. Moore was an intuitionist as we can see by his claim that we have the nonnatural ability to observe moral properties. Moore believed that moral knowledge about particular values is much like sense knowledge, but this is not necessary to intuitionism. An intuitionist may claim that principles, rules, or judgments appeal to our sense of reasonableness, or that we cannot imagine them to be false. Such truths may be thought of as self-evident. This means that as soon as we understand a statement, the statement may appear undeniable, not because we argue in favor of it, but because we can't understand what it would be like for the statement to be false. In this way general principles may be intuitively supported.
    For example, a utilitarian might be an intuitionist. As soon as we understand the utilitarian principle, it may make such good sense that we believe it cannot be reasonably denied. One way to defend utilitarianism is to claim that its truth is self-evident, just as the truth of basic geometrical claims was thought to be self-evident. The truth of the utilitarian principle could be considered clearer, more evident, than the truth of any possible supporting claims. That is, the reasons we offer in support of the principle may seem less likely to be true than the principle itself. A proper defense of utilitarianism should not contain claims even more controversial than the defended doctrine.
    Peter Singer similarly claims that any moral theory must stem from self-evident basic principles, which he calls fundamental axioms:

search for undeniable fundamental axioms; build up a moral theory from them; and use particular moral judgments as supporting evidence, or as a basis for ad hominem arguments, but never so as to suggest that the validity of the theory is determined by the extent to which it matches them.                Top

Evaluating intuitionism

    Intuitionism is an unpopular doctrine in metaethics, and for good reason. Claiming that a moral judgment or principle is intuitively correct is easiest when everyone holds the same beliefs. The more anthropologists teach us about the moral views of people in other places and other times, the more we see that what appears self-evidently bad to us may appear good to others. Philosophers supporting intuitionism may claim that such people have some moral disability. This argument won't work. It is ad hoc and chauvinistic. Furthermore, we know from the history of geometry that the self-evident status of intuitions about the distance between two points is disputable. In geometry, intuitions no longer seem to hold validity. The starting point of a geometry is best considered to be arbitrary, from the point of view of its truth. In mathematical thinking, the power, usefulness, and elegance of the system are what counts, not the self-evident status of its basic axioms.
    We don't need to go into the history of mathematics. We do need to say that some of the most secure intuitions -- e.g, that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line -- are now in dispute. Geometrical intuitions are less controversial than moral intuitions. So when geometry is no longer based on self-evident truths, basing a less rigorous discipline like ethics on self-evident truths is difficult to accept. Whether we appeal to basic intuitions about principles and values or to intuitions about particular judgments, we are faced with the same problems, that so-called intuitions vary from person to person or group to group, and what appears to be self-evident to one person is not so to another. Basic beliefs and judgments in ethics are debated. Reasons are given, whether they are nonmoral reasons or reasons based on other moral values. The appeal to conflicting intuitions runs the risk of hindering interpersonal debate. Morality involves the regulation of social behavior, so any appeal that short-circuits agreement over moral values is not helpful.
    The strength of intuitionism is that it appeals to the fact that some moral beliefs stand so firmly that they take on the look of data. That it is wrong to murder or to abuse a child seems more true than any widely accepted theory. The intuitionist labels such judgments as 'intuitions'. And they certainly appear to be immediate judgments. We don't need to give reasons about them. Yet coming to an immediate judgment can be consistent with giving reasons, or with entering into debate with those who reject our views. Judgments about murder and abuse are supported by basic moral principles and values. They have intuitive appeal, but such judgments may arise because of socialized sympathy with others, or from basic moral education.  Top